Citations in Minnesota
Comprehensive analysis of citations, statistics, and compliance trends for long-term care facilities in Minnesota.
Statistics for Minnesota (Last 12 Months)
Financial Impact (Last 12 Months)
Latest Citations in Minnesota
A resident with dry eye syndrome and degenerative eye disease had orders for cyclosporine ophthalmic emulsion and Refresh Tears, both scheduled at the same time. Medication records and direct observation showed a TMA instilled cyclosporine drops in both eyes and immediately followed with Refresh Tears in both eyes without waiting between medications. This practice conflicted with referenced professional guidance recommending several minutes between multiple eye drops and with the medical provider’s recommendation to wait fifteen minutes between the two ophthalmic medications. No facility policy on ophthalmic medication administration was provided when requested.
A resident with severe cognitive impairment, impaired mobility, and high fall risk was care planned to have wheelchair footrests in place at all times, with staff ensuring proper positioning and monitoring for leaning during transport. A NA transported the resident in a manual wheelchair from the shower without the footrests, and while going through the doorway the wheelchair struck the door frame, causing the resident, who was leaning forward, to fall out. The resident sustained a T12 fracture, head injury with concussion, abrasions and contusions, and multiple right-hand lacerations requiring sutures, and the DON confirmed the care plan had not been followed.
A high‑risk, immobile resident with MS and prior heel DTI developed an avoidable unstageable coccygeal pressure ulcer after staff failed to consistently assess and document skin status, did not transfer or timely provide ordered pressure‑relieving mattresses, and did not reliably perform q2h repositioning. The resident was repeatedly left on a bedpan for prolonged periods despite early reports of this issue, and the toileting care plan was not revised to a bedside commode until after the coccygeal wound had significantly worsened. Wound assessments lacked complete measurements and staging, changes in wound size and color were not promptly recognized as deterioration or reported to providers, and recommended interventions from a wound NP (including an air mattress and offloading) were not promptly implemented. As a result, the coccygeal ulcer rapidly progressed to a large, necrotic, malodorous wound requiring hospital transfer and surgical debridement.
A resident with diabetes, chronic leg ulcer, kidney transplant, and a documented gluteal wound was care-planned for Enhanced Barrier Precautions (EBP), with posted instructions requiring gown and gloves for high-contact care such as transfers and wound care. During a telehealth wound assessment, the DON donned a gown and initially performed hand hygiene but then applied gloves without hand hygiene, removed a soiled dressing from the resident’s gluteal area, discarded it, removed gloves, and applied new gloves again without performing hand hygiene between glove changes. On another occasion, during use of a sit-to-stand lift, an NA wore gown and gloves, but the DON handled the lift harness, the resident’s clothing, and assisted with the transfer and repositioning while wearing a gown but no gloves, despite EBP requirements for transfers. The DON stated EBP was only needed for catheter or wound care and not for transfers, contradicting the posted EBP instructions and facility policy.
A resident with MS, neurogenic bladder, mobility limitations, and existing pressure injuries was identified as dependent for toileting hygiene and at risk for pressure ulcers, yet the care plan lacked an individualized toileting/incontinence plan and a defined repositioning schedule. Despite a new coccyx pressure ulcer and documentation that interventions such as increased repositioning and incontinent care were needed, the care plan was not revised for a period of time to reflect these changes. During this time, the resident sometimes fell asleep on a bedpan and remained on it until staff removed it, and staff were not initially informed that the bedpan should no longer be used. The DON later acknowledged that the care plan revisions for turning, repositioning, and toileting were delayed until after the resident’s coccyx ulcer had significantly worsened.
A resident with diabetes, Crohn’s disease, bowel incontinence, and a history of MASD on the right gluteus developed an open, painful lesion on the right gluteal area that was documented over time without complete wound characteristics, clear etiology, or timely provider notification. Wound care orders were written for a stage 3 pressure ulcer on the left buttocks, while staff reported the wound was only on the right side and applied the left‑sided orders to the right gluteal wound in the absence of specific right‑side treatment orders. The DON acknowledged discomfort with staging the wound, lack of early physician notification, and confusion over wound classification, despite a facility policy requiring comprehensive wound assessment, consistent measurement, and provider notification when treatment orders are absent.
A resident with bilateral heel pressure ulcers and multiple comorbidities received wound care during which an RN removed dressings from both heels, cleansed both wounds, and wiped each heel without changing gloves or performing hand hygiene between wounds or after disposing of soiled dressings. This practice conflicted with the facility’s written wound care procedure, which requires glove removal and hand hygiene after dressing removal and after wound cleansing. In interviews, the RN, NP, and DON/IP acknowledged that hand hygiene and glove changes are expected between dirty and clean tasks and between separate wounds to prevent infection.
A resident with spastic hemiplegia, muscle weakness, and moderate cognitive impairment was observed using bilateral bed grab bars for bed mobility and transfers, but the care plan did not address grab bar or side rail use. Review of the EMR showed no completed bed mobility device or side rail assessment to determine the necessity or safety of the grab bars, and no documentation that risks and benefits were discussed or that informed consent was obtained. An LPN and the ADON stated that a bed mobility device assessment is required before grab bars are installed and confirmed that no such assessment existed for this resident.
A resident with severe dementia, psychiatric disorders, and high dependence for ADLs was verbally abused during evening care when a NA, frustrated with the resident’s crying and resistance, loudly ridiculed her as acting like a two-year-old, threatened to hit her back if struck, told her she would be sent to a locked unit, and questioned who would want to care for her when she cried like a baby. Multiple staff witnessed the loud, stern, and intimidating tone and reported it to an LPN, who recognized it as verbal abuse but did not immediately remove the NA from duty or promptly report the allegation per policy, allowing the NA to continue working on the unit. Following this incident, the resident demonstrated increased crying, combativeness, resistance to care, wandering, self-isolation, and refusal of food, fluids, and medications above baseline, with documentation of significant emotional distress and subsequent ED evaluation for aggressive behaviors and poor intake.
A resident with dementia, bilateral above‑knee amputations, vascular disease, and severe protein‑calorie malnutrition developed a wound on an amputation stump that had a dressing dated several days before any documentation or treatment orders appeared in the record. Although bath audits and nursing notes initially reported no skin issues, a later assessment described a full‑thickness stage 4 ulcer/diabetic ulcer on the stump with exposed bone, erythema/edema, slough, and moderate serosanguineous drainage. Nursing staff interviews showed no one could identify who first discovered the wound or applied the initial dressing, and there was no evidence that the wound was assessed, the provider notified, or standing orders implemented when it was first present, despite facility expectations that new wounds be promptly evaluated and reported.
Failure to Follow Professional Standards for Ophthalmic Medication Administration
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to follow professional standards of practice for administering ophthalmic medications to a resident with dry eye syndrome and degenerative eye disease. The resident was cognitively intact, required assistance with ADLs, and had physician orders for cyclosporine ophthalmic emulsion 0.05% one drop in both eyes twice daily and Refresh Tears ophthalmic solution one drop in both eyes four times daily for dry eyes. The administration summary showed that both eye medications were scheduled for the same time and were documented as being given at the same time on multiple dates. During a medication pass observation, a trained medication aide administered the ordered oral medications, then applied gloves and instilled one drop of cyclosporine in each eye, immediately followed by one drop of Refresh Tears in each eye, without any waiting period between the two medications. The surveyors referenced guidance from the American Academy of Allergy, Asthma, and Immunology stating that when more than one eye drop is ordered, three to four minutes should be allowed between drops in the same eye, and five to fifteen minutes should be allowed between different eye medications to prevent dilution. Interviews with the DON, pharmacy consultant, and medical provider confirmed that best practice and the provider’s recommendation were to wait between administration of cyclosporine and Refresh Tears, with the medical provider specifying a fifteen-minute interval. The facility did not provide a policy on ophthalmic medications when requested. The observed practice and documented administration times demonstrated that staff did not follow these professional standards or the medical provider’s recommended interval between the two eye medications.
Failure to Follow Wheelchair Transport Care Plan Leads to Fall With Injuries
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to implement care-planned fall prevention interventions for a resident at high risk for falls, resulting in a fall with injury. The resident had diagnoses including aphasia, dysphagia, muscle weakness, traumatic brain injury, and impaired mobility, with severe cognitive impairment documented on the MDS and dependence on staff for transfers and wheelchair transport. A care plan addressing wheelchair transport safety and positioning directed staff to ensure the resident was fully positioned and supported in the wheelchair prior to transport, verify footrests were in place prior to transport, and monitor for leaning, sliding, or unsafe positioning. An additional care-planned approach required wheelchair pedals to be on at all times. On the date of the incident, a nursing assistant transported the resident in a manual wheelchair from the shower room to the resident’s room without the foot pedals in place, contrary to the care plan. While being wheeled through the doorway, the wheelchair struck the door frame, causing the chair to stop and the resident, who had begun leaning forward, to fall out of the wheelchair onto the floor. Progress notes and ED documentation identified that the resident sustained a T12 vertebral fracture, a head injury with concussion, an abrasion and contusion to the head, a bruise to the left knee, and multiple lacerations to the right hand requiring sutures. The nursing assistant later acknowledged awareness that the foot pedals should have been on but did not apply them because the transport was only from the shower to the room. The DON confirmed that the resident’s care plan had not been followed when the fall occurred.
Failure to Implement and Update Pressure Ulcer Prevention and Treatment Led to Avoidable Unstageable Coccygeal Ulcer
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to adequately assess, monitor, and implement individualized pressure ulcer prevention and treatment interventions for multiple high‑risk residents, resulting in an avoidable, unstageable coccygeal pressure ulcer for one resident that required surgical debridement and hospitalization. The resident had primary progressive multiple sclerosis, hereditary spastic paraplegia, obesity, and pre‑existing pressure‑related deep tissue injury to the left heel, and was identified as high risk for pressure ulcers on the Braden Scale due to constant moisture, chairfast status, very limited mobility, inadequate nutrition, and friction/shear risk. Hospital records on readmission documented irritant contact dermatitis of the bilateral gluteal cleft with specific cleansing and barrier cream orders, and facility documentation showed the resident could not reposition in bed or chair and required assist of two and a full‑body mechanical lift for transfers. Despite this, the admission/readmission skin assessment and weekly skin checks lacked measurements and detailed wound characteristics for the heel ulcer and gluteal dermatitis, and the care plan did not include comprehensive, individualized interventions beyond generic repositioning and wound care orders. After a new coccyx pressure ulcer was identified and documented as a stage 2 lesion, the facility failed to promptly and accurately update the care plan and implement recommended pressure‑relieving interventions. The wound nurse practitioner on 3/5 ordered coccyx wound care, an air mattress, pressure offloading, and a dietician consult, but the care plan was not revised and there was no evidence that an air mattress was placed on the bed for nearly two weeks. The environmental services director later confirmed that when the resident was moved to a new room, the gel mattress was not transferred, and the air mattress requested on 3/17 was not actually placed until the following day, despite being marked as completed. During this period, TAR documentation showed gaps in the every‑2‑hour repositioning order, and staff interviews revealed that CNAs were unaware of which residents were on repositioning programs, were not consistently repositioning residents, and had not received recent education on pressure ulcer prevention. The DON and RN case manager acknowledged that the coccyx wound increased in size and changed color between assessments, that the bed lacked the ordered gel mattress, and that the physician was not notified of the wound’s deterioration at that time. The facility also failed to timely modify toileting and incontinence care practices despite knowledge that the resident was being left on a bedpan for extended periods. The DON reported hearing before an IDT meeting that the resident had fallen asleep on a bedpan for an undetermined amount of time, but the care plan was not revised to discontinue bedpan use and implement a bedside commode until after the coccyx wound had significantly worsened. CNAs confirmed that the resident sometimes fell asleep on the bedpan and that they were not informed she should no longer use it until after the sore had worsened. Subsequent wound assessments documented rapid progression of the coccyx wound from a small stage 2 ulcer to a large, malodorous, necrotic wound with eschar, slough, erythema, and purulent drainage, ultimately classified as an unstageable pressure ulcer. The DON, NP, PA, and medical director all indicated that the lack of a pressure‑relieving mattress, failure to adjust pressure‑reducing interventions, and prolonged time on a bedpan likely contributed to the development and deterioration of the resident’s pressure ulcer, which was determined to be avoidable and resulted in hospitalization and surgical debridement. Additional documentation and interviews showed systemic assessment and communication failures related to pressure ulcer management. Weekly skin checks and wound assessments often omitted complete measurements, staging, and wound characteristics, and changes in wound size and appearance were not consistently recognized as deterioration or communicated to providers. The DON acknowledged that a 3/12 assessment showing increased wound size and purple discoloration should have been identified as a deep tissue injury and reported to the physician, but this did not occur. When nursing later documented foul odor, increased pain, and expanding necrotic tissue, telemedicine and PA responses deferred in‑person evaluation and ED transfer despite earlier recommendations that the resident be sent to the ED if an in‑person provider could not assess the wound. The NP ultimately found a large, malodorous, purulent wound with expanding eschar and ordered transfer to the hospital, where imaging and surgical findings confirmed a large necrotic sacral wound requiring extensive debridement. Throughout this sequence, the facility did not consistently follow its own pressure ulcer protocols, did not ensure ordered pressure‑relieving equipment was in place, and did not promptly revise care plans or interventions in response to known risk factors and documented wound changes. The report also notes that other residents reviewed for pressure ulcers were affected by similar failures in monitoring and individualized intervention, though detailed narratives focus primarily on this resident. Staff interviews revealed that CNAs relied on paper care guides that did not clearly identify residents on repositioning programs or at risk for skin breakdown, and that they were unaware of some residents’ special mattress orders or toileting restrictions. The DON and medical director stated that residents at risk for pressure ulcers should have immediate pressure‑relieving interventions and that existing ulcers require ongoing evaluation to prevent deterioration, but the documented practices for this resident did not align with those expectations. These combined actions and inactions—insufficient assessment detail, delayed or missing care plan revisions, failure to implement ordered support surfaces and repositioning, and delayed response to wound deterioration—constituted the deficiency in providing appropriate pressure ulcer care and preventing new ulcers from developing.
Failure to Perform Hand Hygiene and Implement Enhanced Barrier Precautions During Wound Care and Transfers
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure proper hand hygiene during wound care and to consistently implement Enhanced Barrier Precautions (EBP) for a resident requiring such measures. The resident had diagnoses including diabetes, a non-pressure chronic ulcer of the right lower leg, and a kidney transplant, and a wound assessment documented an open lesion on the right gluteal area. The resident’s care plan and a sign posted outside the room specified that EBP, including gown and gloves, were required for high-contact care activities such as dressing, bathing, transferring, providing hygiene, changing linens, changing briefs or assisting with toileting, catheter care, and wound care. During one observation, the DON performed hand hygiene and donned a gown before entering the resident’s room for a telehealth wound assessment. Inside the room, the DON went into the bathroom, applied gloves without performing hand hygiene, removed the resident’s brief, and removed a foam dressing from the right gluteal area that had stool on one corner. After discarding the soiled dressing, the DON removed gloves and then applied new gloves without performing hand hygiene between glove changes. When questioned, the DON stated that hand hygiene should be done when hands or gloves are visibly soiled and before and after removing or applying gloves, and acknowledged that hand hygiene had not been performed each time gloves were removed and reapplied. In a separate observation, the resident was transferred using a sit-to-stand mechanical lift while EBP requirements were not fully followed. An NA entered the room wearing a gown and gloves with the lift, and the DON applied the lift harness under the resident’s arms and cinched the waist strap, encountering the resident’s clothing, while not wearing gloves. After the transfer to bed, the DON pulled down the resident’s pants and removed the harness while touching the resident’s clothes. Following wound care by a CNP-WOC, the DON again assisted the resident by sitting the resident on the edge of the bed, applying the lift harness, and adjusting the resident’s pants and shirt while wearing a gown but no gloves. The DON stated that EBP was only needed for catheter or wound care and not for transfers, and only upon reading the posted EBP sign acknowledged that EBP was required for all high-contact resident care activities, including transfers.
Failure to Timely Revise Care Plan for Toileting and Skin Integrity
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to timely revise and individualize a resident’s care plan to address toileting and incontinence needs in relation to impaired skin integrity. The resident had diagnoses including primary progressive multiple sclerosis, hereditary spastic paraplegia, obesity, and a pressure-induced deep tissue injury to the left heel. A Significant Change MDS identified the resident as dependent for toileting hygiene, with lower extremity range-of-motion limitations, wheelchair use, dependence for transfers, occasional urinary incontinence, intact cognition, and at risk for pressure ulcers with existing unhealed pressure injuries and MASD. The resident’s skin-focused care plan, revised on various dates, included skin inspections, wound care orders, weekly skin checks, pressure ulcer care to the left heel, nutritional supplements, and a gel mattress, but did not include an individualized toileting or incontinence plan. On a weekly skin check dated 3/3/26, nursing staff identified a new Stage 2 pressure ulcer on the coccyx and contact dermatitis on both gluteal folds. An IDT Final Post Review Follow Up dated 3/10/26 (signed 3/23/26) documented that a new skin issue had occurred and that interventions after the incident included wound care treatment orders, increased repositioning, and increased incontinent care. However, the resident’s care plan from 3/3/26 through 3/16/26 did not show revisions reflecting increased incontinence care or a repositioning schedule, and the care plan was not updated to include these elements until 3/17/26. During this period, the care plan still lacked an individualized toileting plan despite the resident’s identified incontinence and new coccyx pressure ulcer. Progress notes on 3/17/26 documented that the resident’s coccyx wound had declined, with an evaluation describing a deteriorating wound characterized as a Kennedy terminal ulcer/End of Life, staged as a Stage 4 pressure ulcer, in-house acquired, with increased size, exudate, odor, pain, and surrounding erythema. On that same date, the skin focus care plan was revised to include prompt incontinence care and keeping the skin clean and dry, and the elimination focus care plan was revised to address incontinence due to neurogenic bladder with use of a bedside commode offered every 2–3 hours. A nursing assistant reported that when working with the resident, the resident would sometimes fall asleep on the bedpan and forget to ask staff to remove it, and that she was not aware the resident was not supposed to use the bedpan until after the sore had worsened. The DON stated that the resident’s care plan had not been revised earlier to include a turning and repositioning schedule or toileting changes, and that it should have been revised as soon as staff learned the resident was falling asleep on the bedpan, rather than waiting until after the pressure ulcer worsened.
Failure to Assess and Notify Provider for Right Gluteal Wound
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to comprehensively assess and appropriately manage a non‑pressure skin issue on a resident’s right gluteal area, and to notify the physician in a timely manner. The resident had diagnoses including diabetes, Crohn’s disease, and a kidney transplant, and the MDS indicated occasional bowel incontinence, no pressure ulcers, and no moisture‑associated skin damage at that time. Earlier documentation identified a resolved MASD to the right gluteus, and a progress note later described a sacral wound with creams applied, noting that sores were still open and painful during application, but without any measurements, wound characteristics, or evidence of physician notification. Subsequent wound assessments documented an open lesion on the right gluteus with specific measurements on multiple dates, but did not identify the wound type or other characteristics, and the record did not show physician notification or treatment orders for the right gluteal lesion. Provider orders in place initially addressed cleansing the buttocks and applying barrier cream, and later included a detailed wound care order for a stage 3 pressure ulcer documented on the left buttocks. However, the resident’s record did not contain a specific treatment order for the right gluteal wound, despite the ongoing documentation of an open lesion in that area. Interviews revealed confusion and inconsistency in wound identification and classification. The DON stated that the right gluteal wound was documented as an open lesion because she did not feel comfortable determining the wound type, and acknowledged that the physician should have been notified when the wound was first identified. The DON was unaware that the NP had documented the wound as being on the left buttocks and as a stage 3 pressure ulcer, while the RN reported that the wound had never been on the left buttocks and that she had been applying the left‑sided wound orders to the right gluteal area because there was no open area on the left. The resident reported a recurring painful area on the right buttocks and chronic stool leakage since prior anal fistula surgery. The facility’s own wound treatment policy required comprehensive assessment of wound etiology and characteristics, consistent measurement and documentation, and provider notification in the absence of treatment orders, which were not followed for this resident’s right gluteal wound. The deficiency centers on the lack of a comprehensive wound assessment for the right gluteal lesion, incomplete documentation of wound characteristics, failure to clearly determine and document the wound etiology, and failure to notify the physician and obtain appropriate treatment orders when the wound was identified and remained open. These actions and inactions resulted in a discrepancy between the documented wound location and type and the actual clinical presentation, as well as a period during which the right gluteal wound had no specific, clearly ordered treatment despite being open and painful.
Failure to Perform Hand Hygiene and Change Gloves During Wound Care
Penalty
Summary
Surveyors observed that a registered nurse (RN) and a nurse practitioner (NP) did not follow the facility’s established infection control practices during wound care for one resident. During a wound treatment, the RN wore gloves while removing the dressing from the resident’s left heel, then removed the dressing from the right heel, sprayed both wounds with wound cleanser, wiped the left heel with gauze, and then used a clean gauze pad to wipe the right heel. The RN did not remove her gloves or perform hand hygiene after disposing of the soiled dressings or between cleaning the left and right heel wounds, contrary to the facility’s written wound care procedure, which requires glove removal and hand hygiene after removing the previous dressing and again after cleaning the wound. The resident’s admission MDS documented diagnoses including multiple rib fractures, heart failure, dementia, anxiety, and the presence of a pressure ulcer, and indicated the resident was cognitively intact and required staff assistance with care and transfers. The resident’s care plan identified pressure ulcers on both heels requiring wound care. In interviews, the RN, NP, and the DON/infection prevention nurse each stated that gloves should be changed when moving from dirty to clean areas and that hand hygiene is expected after glove removal and between wounds to prevent infection, confirming that the observed practice did not align with facility policy or expected infection control standards.
Failure to Assess, Care Plan, and Obtain Consent for Bed Grab Bar Use
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to follow required procedures before installing and using bed grab bars for a resident. The resident had diagnoses including spastic hemiplegia affecting the left side and muscle weakness, and an admission MDS indicating moderate cognitive impairment. During observation, the resident was seen in a power chair with bilateral grab bars on the bed and reported using them to roll in bed and for transfers. The resident’s care plan, dated 1/23/26, documented a need for assistance with bed mobility and independence with transfers but did not mention or address the use of grab bars or side rails. Review of the electronic medical record showed no completed grab bar/side rail or bed mobility device assessment to determine the necessity of the grab bars or whether the resident could safely use them. There was also no evidence that the resident or the resident’s representative had been educated on the risks of having a grab bar on the bed or that informed consent had been obtained. In interviews, an LPN and the ADON both stated that a bed mobility device assessment was required to determine need and safety prior to installing grab bars, and both confirmed that no such assessment was present in the resident’s record.
Failure to Protect Resident From Verbal Abuse and Delay in Removing Alleged Perpetrator
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to protect a vulnerable resident from mental abuse and to respond appropriately to an allegation of abuse. The resident had severe cognitive impairment, Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, anxiety, depression, psychotic disorder, and significant functional dependence, including frequent incontinence and the need for extensive assistance with ADLs and transfers. Her care plan identified behavioral and mood issues such as wandering, yelling, combative behavior, and calling staff names, with interventions including calm approaches, emotional support, redirection, and monitoring for emotional distress and mood/behavior changes. She was identified as a vulnerable adult, with instructions to monitor for signs of emotional distress and to follow the facility’s abuse reporting policy. On the evening in question, while the resident was crying on the phone with her son and expressing a desire to leave, NA-A and NA-B entered to provide evening care using an EZ stand lift. After the resident ended the phone call, multiple staff reported that NA-A spoke to the resident in a loud, stern, and frustrated tone, telling her to stop crying and that she was acting like a two-year-old. When the resident swatted at NA-A, NA-A stated, “If you hit me, I’m going to hit you back,” and later told the resident she was “in trouble now.” Staff reported that NA-A told the resident she would be sent to a locked unit so she could not get out, and questioned who would want to care for her when she cried like a baby, and that nobody would want to keep working with her. NA-C described NA-A yelling commands such as “HOLD ON!” and “Stop crying! Where would you be if you were not here? Probably lying on the floor,” and felt NA-A was obviously upset and overwhelmed. These statements were made in the presence of the resident while she was already distressed and crying. Following this interaction, the resident exhibited crying, yelling, combativeness, resistance to care, wandering into other residents’ rooms, self-isolation, and refusal of food, fluids, and medications above her prior baseline, as documented in behavior charts, target behavior monitoring, and nursing progress notes. Staff documented that she cried most of the morning, was very restless, difficult to redirect, hit and pinched staff, called staff names, and refused care and meals. She required repeated redirection, 1:1 attention, and non-pharmacological interventions, and was ultimately sent to the ED for evaluation of combativeness and emotional distress, where she was treated for dementia with aggressive behavior and hypoglycemia related to poor intake. The report identifies that the resident’s actual response and the reasonable person concept showed serious psychosocial harm, including increased crying and combative behavior above baseline, fear/anxiety manifested as combativeness, resistance to care and social interaction, and self-isolation. The facility also failed to immediately remove the alleged perpetrator from resident care and to promptly report and investigate the allegation in accordance with its abuse policy. After NA-B and NA-C reported to LPN-A that NA-A had yelled at and threatened the resident, LPN-A acknowledged it as verbal abuse but did not initiate immediate protective measures or timely reporting. LPN-A stated she believed she had 24 hours to report because there was no injury, despite facility policy requiring reporting within two hours. NA-A remained on the unit and continued working until the end of her shift, including after staff had clearly communicated their concerns to LPN-A. TMA and NA staff described uncertainty about their authority to remove NA-A and reliance on the nurse to act, while the DON later informed LPN-A that NA-A should have been removed from the floor to prevent further danger to residents. The Immediate Jeopardy was determined to have begun when NA-A’s derogatory, intimidating, and threatening statements were made and continued while she remained on duty with access to the resident and other vulnerable residents.
Failure to Timely Assess and Treat Newly Discovered Stump Wound
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide timely treatment and care for a newly discovered wound on a resident’s above‑knee amputation stump. The resident was admitted with diagnoses including unspecified dementia with behavioral disturbances, vascular dementia, bilateral above‑knee amputations, vascular disease, reduced mobility, and severe protein‑calorie malnutrition, and had no documented ulcers or skin problems on admission or on the most recent MDS. A weekly bath audit on 3/17/26 documented only non‑tender lymph nodes on the right upper hip and did not identify any open areas. However, when the wound was later assessed, the dressing on the stump was dated 3/16/26, indicating that a wound and dressing existed at that time, even though no corresponding assessment, provider notification, or treatment orders were documented. On 3/23/26, nursing staff documented a new skin issue above the resident’s knee at the amputation site, describing a stage 4 pressure ulcer/injury with full‑thickness skin and tissue loss, exposed bone, erythema/edema, and moderate serosanguineous exudate. The wound measured 1.56 cm by 1.64 cm, with 20–29% granulation tissue and 80% slough. A progress note and skin issues assessment on that date confirmed the wound characteristics and staging, and the NP, after reviewing a picture, determined the wound to be a diabetic ulcer with peripheral vascular disease and severe protein‑calorie malnutrition as contributing factors. On that same date, the NP was notified, antibiotic therapy (doxycycline) was ordered for possible cellulitis, and specific wound care orders were initiated, with documentation on the MAR that these treatments were carried out beginning 3/23/26. Multiple interviews with nursing staff revealed that no one could identify who discovered the wound or who applied the initial dressing dated 3/16/26, and there was no documentation of a wound assessment, provider notification, or interim treatment between 3/16/26 and 3/22/26. Several RNs and LPNs who worked shifts from 3/16/26 through 3/20/26 stated they did not notice a wound on the stump and that, per their usual practice, they would have contacted the provider and initiated treatment if they had found one. One LPN recalled seeing a band‑aid with a date on the stump but could not recall the date, and another LPN stated she did not see the wound because she was not looking for one. The facility’s standing orders required staff to assess all wounds daily, change dressings every three days and as needed, treat with normal saline or non‑cytotoxic cleanser and appropriate dressings, and notify the provider the next business day when a new wound or injury was found. Despite these expectations, the wound identified by the dated dressing on 3/16/26 was not assessed, reported, or treated according to orders and facility policy until 3/23/26.
Some of the Latest Corrective Actions taken by Facilities in Minnesota
- Reeducated staff using the facility’s mechanical lift competency checklist via shift huddles and 1:1 sessions conducted by the DON, nurse manager, and staff development nurse (J - F0689 - MN)
- Completed audits/observations of mechanical lift transfers using the lift competency checklist to verify correct practice (J - F0689 - MN)
- Identified all residents using sit-to-stand/mechanical lifts and verified correct sling/harness sizing through therapy documentation, direct measurement, manufacturer guidelines, and care plan accuracy (J - F0689 - MN)
- Reviewed and updated the mechanical lift transfer policy to require sling/harness size documented in the care plan and Kardex, require 2-assist transfers when indicated, require staff verification of sling size prior to transfer, and require cinching of waist/middle straps before elevation (J - F0689 - MN)
- Updated care plans, Kardex, and care sheets to specifically identify lift type, assist level, and sling/harness size and ensure consistency across documents (J - F0689 - MN)
- Educated licensed nurses and other certified individuals on mechanical lift use including manufacturer recommendations, proper sling application, proper strap placement and cinching, when sit-to-stand lifts were contraindicated, and following the care plan (J - F0689 - MN)
Improper Mechanical Lift Transfer Leading to Resident Fall and Rib Fractures
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure a safe mechanical lift transfer by not confirming that all four sling straps were properly attached before moving a resident. The resident involved was an elderly female with hemiplegia and hemiparesis following cerebral infarction affecting the left side, osteoarthritis, and fibromyalgia, who required a mechanical lift with assistance of two staff for transfers and used a medium-sized sling. On the day of the incident, two NAs used the mechanical lift and the appropriately sized sling to transfer the resident from her wheelchair to her bed. One NA attached the right upper and lower loops of the sling while positioned on the resident’s right side, and the other NA attached the lower loops and was responsible for operating the lift. After the sling was attached, the NAs raised the resident into the air and moved the lift backward, pausing between the wheelchair and the bed to obtain the resident’s weight using the lift’s weighing feature. During this process, the top left strap of the sling came loose from the lift, causing the resident to fall from the lift onto her left shoulder. The resident sustained acute displaced fractures of the 2nd and 3rd left ribs and required transfer to the hospital for further evaluation and care. The incident was documented in a progress note and an incident report, and an IDT meeting was held regarding the fall. Interviews conducted during the survey revealed that facility policy and staff expectations required that all four sling loops be checked for secure attachment before moving a resident, including lifting the resident slightly off the surface to verify tension and stability of the loops. The DON and nurse manager stated that staff are expected to perform a safety check by slightly lifting the resident and visually confirming that all sling loops are tight and completely attached before proceeding with the transfer. The DON’s investigation concluded that the upper left loop of the sling was either not attached or not properly attached by one of the NAs, and that both NAs failed to complete the required pause and safety check prior to moving the resident away from the original surface. This failure to follow established procedures for mechanical lift use led directly to the resident’s fall and injuries.
Removal Plan
- Removed the mechanical lift and sling involved in the incident from the floor
- Interviewed the staff involved and completed reenactments/demonstrations to determine what happened
- Suspended NA-A and NA-B pending investigation findings
- Immediately reeducated all staff on shift using the existing mechanical lift competency checklist used for onboarding
- Continued retraining for all shifts, including part-time staff and staff returning from leave as applicable
- Provided education via shift huddles and 1:1 reeducation sessions conducted by the DON, nurse manager, and staff development nurse
- Completed audits/observations of mechanical lift transfers for like-residents using the lift competency checklist to verify correct practice
Failure to Provide Adequate Supervision and Individualized Elopement Interventions
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure an environment free from accident hazards and to provide adequate supervision and individualized, care-planned interventions for residents at risk of elopement. One resident with severe cognitive impairment and a diagnosis of malnutrition was initially assessed on admission as non-wandering and completely dependent for mobility and personal care. However, an elopement assessment completed days later identified this resident as an elopement risk who was able to self-propel a wheelchair, was cognitively impaired, actively exit-seeking, and expressing a desire to go home. The resident’s care plan, initiated after this assessment, included use of a wander device, monitoring the device for proper functioning, and prompt response to door alarms, but it lacked specific supervision measures and individualized interventions tailored to the resident’s escalating exit-seeking behavior. In the days leading up to the elopement, multiple progress notes documented that this resident was wandering up and down the hallway, confused, disoriented, and repeatedly attempting to leave the facility despite staff redirection. On the day of the elopement, documentation indicated the resident was very agitated, wandering into other residents’ rooms, calling the police, stating staff were holding her hostage, and attempting to leave multiple times. Video surveillance from the floor exit area showed the resident making several attempts over the course of the evening to open the stairwell and exit doors, triggering alarms that were reset by staff who redirected her away from the doors. Despite these repeated attempts and clear evidence of escalating exit-seeking, no additional formal interventions beyond the wander device were implemented, and staff did not revise the care plan to include increased supervision or other individualized strategies. Later that evening, the video showed the resident successfully exiting through the floor door without staff present. A police report documented that the resident, who was not dressed for the weather and wearing all black, was later found about five blocks from the facility after knocking on a private residence’s door and asking for help. She was transported to the hospital for evaluation and was discharged in stable condition without injuries. Interviews with staff revealed that agency NAs working that shift were not informed which residents were at risk for elopement and that their care sheets did not identify elopement risks or related interventions. Additional residents assessed as elopement risks also had care plans that included wander devices and general directions to monitor for exit-seeking and answer door alarms, but these plans similarly lacked specific supervision measures and individualized interventions, and NA care sheets did not consistently reflect elopement risk status. The facility’s elopement policy directed staff to establish a process to check bracelet alarm/device batteries according to manufacturer directions, and the user guide for the wander management transmitters required at least weekly testing to verify proper operation. Interviews with nursing and management staff showed inconsistent understanding of responsibilities for testing and ensuring functionality of wander devices, as well as for updating care plans and communicating elopement risk to direct care staff. Some nurses believed only nurse managers or the DON could change care plans, while the DON stated all nurses could make care plan changes. Nurse managers reported that residents at risk for elopement should be noted on NA care sheets, but agency NAs reported they were not alerted to any residents at risk to wander or elope. These documented gaps in assessment translation to care plans, supervision, communication, and device management contributed to the resident’s elopement and the identified deficiency. Three additional residents identified as elopement risks had diagnoses including dementia, moderate to severe cognitive impairment, and conditions such as breast cancer and acute encephalopathy. Their elopement assessments indicated confusion, disorientation, and requests to go home. Their care plans directed use of wander devices, monitoring and documentation of exit-seeking behavior, prompt response to door alarms, and inviting them to activities, but similarly lacked explicit supervision requirements and individualized interventions to prevent elopement. NA care sheets for these residents either did not indicate elopement risk or did not include interventions to prevent elopement. These findings showed that the facility failed to consistently integrate elopement risk assessments into clear, individualized supervision strategies and to communicate those strategies to all staff responsible for resident care.
Removal Plan
- Audited the care plans of residents identified as elopement risks
- Provided education to staff regarding the elopement policy
- Provided education to staff regarding elopement assessments
- Provided education to staff regarding one-to-one supervision
- Provided education to staff regarding safety checks
- Provided education to staff regarding wander device management
- Developed and implemented individualized care plans with interventions including supervision for residents at risk for elopement
Failure to Manage NPO, Food-Seeking Resident on G-Tube Feeding
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to adequately assess, care plan, implement interventions, and provide supervision for a resident who was NPO and dependent on G-tube feedings, despite known food-seeking behaviors and severe cognitive impairment. The resident’s admission MDS documented severe cognitive impairment, dependence on staff for ADLs, incontinence, and G-tube nutrition, with NPO status due to dysphagia and a history of silent aspiration. On 2/19, the care plan and a risk-versus-benefit form identified that the resident self-sought food and fluids while NPO, required reminders and redirection, and was at risk for aspiration, pneumonia, loss of airway, hospitalization, and possible death if consuming oral intake. The RD documented that the resident was self-seeking food and fluids, had impaired cognition, and could not repeat back understanding of the NPO education, and an order was added to the TAR to observe for self-seeking food and provide re-education as needed. Subsequent clinical notes showed ongoing concerns that the resident was eating and drinking despite strict NPO orders. On 2/25, the NP documented that staff reported continued food- and fluid-seeking, and the resident nodded yes when asked if she was eating or drinking; a chest X-ray was ordered, which was normal. On 3/4, the NP again documented silent aspiration, cough, coarse lung sounds, and that the resident continued to report oral intake despite strict NPO, and another chest X-ray was ordered and read as normal. An email exchange on 2/24 showed the IDT was aware of the resident’s low SLUMS score indicating dementia, wandering, and the need for a memory care bed, but no new interventions were established beyond continued monitoring when no memory care bed was available. Staff interviews and documentation revealed multiple unaddressed episodes of food-seeking and wandering into areas where food was present. A staff member reported seeing the resident eating a gummy jolly rancher given by another resident and observing her wandering into other residents’ rooms and attempting to eat food from leftover trays, as well as being in the dining room during and after meals; the record lacked evidence of any action taken in response to these events. Another staff member also reported seeing the resident wandering all over the unit and in the dining room during and after meals. The SLP stated the resident had severe cognitive deficits, wandered around the unit, did not understand what NPO meant, and was at high risk for aspiration if she ate regular food or fluids, based on a prior hospital video swallow study recommending NPO. The NP later stated she was never informed about the resident eating gummy candy and would have expected immediate notification for further assessment and monitoring. Ultimately, the resident was found unresponsive with heavy breathing and a very high temperature, was sent to the ED, and was diagnosed with acute hypoxic and hypercarbic respiratory failure with aspiration pneumonia; large food material was suctioned from the oropharynx, and the resident required intubation and CPR for a brief cardiac arrest. The surveyors concluded that the facility failed to assess, develop, and implement appropriate interventions and supervision for this known NPO, food-seeking resident, resulting in an immediate jeopardy situation.
Removal Plan
- Completed a full house audit of residents with modified diets
- Audited care plans for residents with modified diets
- Provided training to staff on modified diets and changes made to care plans
Failure to Recognize and Respond to Resident’s Change in Condition Leading to Sepsis and Hospitalization
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to identify and act on a resident’s change in condition despite clear signs of acute illness and a care plan for potential infection. The resident had intact cognition per the annual MDS and no baseline hallucinations, delusions, or behaviors. Her care plan identified a self-care deficit and potential for infection related to urinary incontinence, with directions to update the provider as needed. Beginning several days before hospitalization, progress notes documented new hallucinations and emotional distress, including the resident yelling and crying about her babies being murdered and being taken from her, and an IDT discussion noting hallucinations and behavioral changes. These symptoms were atypical for this resident and represented a change from her baseline. Over the following days, the resident developed and sustained fevers and other signs of systemic illness. Vital signs showed temperatures of 101.7°F with a pulse of 140 bpm, later rising to 103.2°F and remaining elevated around 101–100°F over multiple readings, along with low-grade fevers on subsequent days. Progress notes documented vomiting, visible shaking, feeling cold, episodes of incontinent diarrhea, reports of pain “everywhere,” crying, tearfulness, fatigue, and refusal of medications and meals. Despite these findings, nursing staff treated the resident only with scheduled acetaminophen and did not conduct a documented comprehensive nursing assessment or notify the provider when the fevers and other symptoms emerged and persisted. The IDT discussed the resident’s fevers, fatigue, medication refusals, and verbal behaviors but did not review the progress notes or vital signs in detail, and no provider notification occurred at that time. Staff interviews further confirmed that the change in condition was not appropriately recognized or escalated. One RN stated she had not identified anything out of the ordinary beyond weakness and a presumed low-grade influenza, and that staff believed the resident might be recovering when a single temperature reading was normal. Another RN acknowledged that the resident’s change in condition occurred over a weekend when the IDT was not present and that the team did not review the progress notes or vital signs during the subsequent IDT meeting. A different RN reported that she did not assess the resident after the IDT discussion because the resident was asleep and her temperature had decreased slightly, and she felt that the resident’s bipolar diagnosis and prior behaviors had masked the change and interfered with judgment. The facility’s own policy required licensed nurses to evaluate significant changes in condition, obtain vital signs, and notify the provider of abnormal vital signs, behavioral or neurological changes, and worsening pain, but this process was not followed for this resident, resulting in delayed recognition and treatment of sepsis and subsequent hospitalization. Ultimately, the resident was sent to the ED only after she appeared pale with a grey hue, had dark circles under her eyes, was shivering, reported generalized pain, and continued to feel unwell. In the ED, she was found to be ill-appearing and toxic-appearing, with a high fever, tachycardia, hypotension, low GFR, and a diagnosis of sepsis with acute renal failure, septic shock, acute kidney injury, ureteral obstruction, and UTI. The attending MD later stated that the facility had not contacted her when the resident developed a fever and that earlier evaluation could have avoided the septic shock. The NP who saw the resident in the ED described her as barely responsive, with low blood pressure requiring IV fluids and vasopressors, and indicated that while the ureteral stone itself was not avoidable, the sepsis and unnecessary pain could have been prevented if the resident had been sent to the ED sooner. These facts support the finding that the facility failed to provide appropriate treatment and care according to orders, the resident’s preferences and goals, and its own change-in-condition policy.
Removal Plan
- Review policies and procedures related to change in condition and physician notification.
- Review all residents for a potential change in condition.
- Educate nursing staff on policies and procedures related to change of condition and resident monitoring, qualifying factors for a change of condition, assessment of resident symptoms without bias, and timely physician notification and treatment of resident symptoms.
Failure to Protect Cognitively Impaired Resident From Physical and Verbal Abuse and Delayed Response to Allegation
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to protect a cognitively impaired resident from physical and verbal abuse by a nurse aide and to respond appropriately once the allegation was reported. On the evening in question, two nurse aides were providing toileting and peri-care to the resident, who had non-Alzheimer’s dementia, depression, a psychotic disorder, and moderately impaired cognition with long- and short-term memory loss. The resident functioned at an estimated developmental level of an 8-year-old, had unclear speech, responded only to simple direct communication, and was dependent on staff for all ADLs including toileting and hygiene. During care, the resident became combative, yelling and swinging her arms, and one aide (NA‑B) responded by raising her voice, using foul and aggressive language, and striking the resident on the bare buttocks while stating that if the resident wanted to act like a child, she would be treated like one. A trained medication assistant (TMA‑A) standing outside the closed door heard NA‑B yelling at the resident to hurry up and grab the “fucking bar” and to walk to bed, and later learned from the other aide (NA‑A) that NA‑B had swatted the resident’s buttocks. NA‑A, who was in the room, described NA‑B’s tone as loud, aggressive, and intimidating, and reported that the resident was grunting and appeared nervous. NA‑A stated that after the resident yelled and grunted during brief placement, NA‑B told the resident that if she wanted to act like a child she would be treated like one, then smacked her on the right buttock with an open hand, skin-to-skin, producing a loud smack. NA‑A reported feeling very uncomfortable and believed the conduct was verbal and physical abuse. After leaving the room, NA‑A immediately told TMA‑A what had happened and, within about five minutes, located the charge nurse (LPN‑A) and reported the incident. NA‑A completed an Employee Concern form describing the incident and placed it in the DON’s box. TMA‑A also informed LPN‑A during the evening medication count that she had heard raised voices, swearing, and the resident crying, and that NA‑B had smacked the resident’s buttocks. Despite these reports, LPN‑A did not read the written complaint, did not conduct an immediate assessment of the resident, did not contact the on‑call nurse, and allowed NA‑B to continue working the remainder of the 12‑hour shift, caring for the resident and other residents without additional supervision. In the hours and days following the incident, the resident demonstrated changes in behavior and mood that were documented by staff. The next morning, staff noted the resident was tearful, withdrawn, and refusing food and drink, including favorite beverages, and she cried while in her wheelchair in a common area. Nursing notes and behavior monitoring entries over the subsequent days documented increased yelling, hitting, scratching, cursing, and physical aggression during care, as well as episodes of sadness, tearfulness, withdrawal, and isolation. Staff familiar with the resident, including RN‑A and NA‑E, reported that this withdrawn, tearful, and non‑eating behavior was not typical for her and that she usually did not cry without a reason. Although a full body assessment was later documented as showing no bruising and no verbalized pain, the facility’s own records and interviews describe that the resident became more tearful, had decreased appetite, and increased crying following the incident, and that she appeared different than normal—quiet, exhausted, withdrawn, and refusing to participate in usual activities and intake. These events, combined with the failure of the charge nurse to act on the initial reports and remove the alleged perpetrator from resident care, led to the cited deficiency for failure to protect the resident from abuse.
Removal Plan
- Reported abuse to the State Agency (SA).
- Investigated allegations of physical and verbal abuse and implemented resident protection.
- Re-educated staff on abuse and neglect, reporting, abuse prevention, resident rights, dementia, and vulnerable adults.
- Verified education through interviews and training records.
Improper Mechanical Lift Use and Inadequate Fall Root Cause Analysis
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure safe use of sit-to-stand and total body mechanical lifts, including correct sling/harness sizing, proper strap application, and adherence to care plans and manufacturer instructions. One resident (R4), with diagnoses including heart failure, chronic kidney disease, pancreatic cancer, diabetes, osteoarthritis, and a history of falls, was assessed as high fall risk and required assistance of two staff with a sit-to-stand lift using a large harness for all transfers. Despite this, on a prior date R4 experienced a witnessed fall from a sit-to-stand lift when a nursing assistant transferred the resident alone, contrary to the care plan, and the resident slipped out of the harness and fell to the floor, later reporting left shoulder pain. The facility’s documentation of that incident did not identify the sling size used, did not show a comprehensive assessment to determine the correct sling size for subsequent transfers, and the care plan was not revised to address the resident’s tendency to fall asleep in the lift. On a later observation, two nursing assistants (NA-C and NA-D) prepared to transfer R4 from bed to shower chair using a sit-to-stand lift with an extra-large (XL) harness draped over the lift, which they both believed was the correct size. Neither had a resident care guide in the room identifying the correct harness size. After the surveyor intervened and prompted verification, NA-D checked the resident care guide and discovered R4 was supposed to use a large harness, not an XL, and had to obtain the correct size from another unit because it was not available on R4’s wing. During the same transfer, after the large harness was applied and R4 was raised to standing, the torso strap was not cinched until the surveyor intervened and instructed the staff to tighten it. NA-C acknowledged she knew the torso strap needed to be cinched as the resident stood and that failure to do so could allow a resident to fall out of the lift, but stated she had overlooked this step. Staff also reported they had not received any re-education on proper mechanical lift use or following care plans since initial orientation. A second resident (R9), with diagnoses including heart failure, chronic respiratory failure, and chronic kidney disease, required total mechanical lift transfers and had been assessed via a sling/harness sizing assessment as needing a large sling. However, the resident’s care plan and Kardex directed staff to use an XL sling, conflicting with the sizing assessment. During observation, R9 was seated in a wheelchair on top of a sling whose size markings were washed off; a trained medication aide identified the sling as XL based on its color coding and confirmed via the Kardex that the resident was supposed to be in a large sling. The aide stated the resident could have fallen out of the oversized sling. The DON later confirmed that staff had been using the paper nurse aide care guide to verify sling size and that R9 had not been transferred with the correct sling size. The facility also failed to comprehensively investigate and analyze falls for root cause and to implement appropriate, person-centered interventions for another resident (R3) with malignant brain neoplasm, heart failure, osteoporosis, moderate cognitive impairment, and a history of falls. R3’s fall care plan included general interventions such as following the fall protocol, routine safety checks, anticipating needs, and reviewing past falls to determine causes, but subsequent fall incident documentation and root cause analysis worksheets were incomplete or lacked clear causal analysis and corresponding interventions. After an unwitnessed bathroom fall assisted by a family member, the root cause section was left blank, and the only care plan revision was to encourage family not to transfer the resident and to ask staff for assistance. Later falls, including one where the resident was found on the bathroom floor without a walker and another where the resident independently walked to the bathroom and lost balance, identified factors such as brain cancer, weakness, and self-transfers, but did not show comprehensive analysis or immediate interventions to mitigate further falls. One intervention, placing a dycem mat in the wheelchair seat, lacked a documented rationale linked to the identified causal factors. The DON acknowledged that comprehensive causal analyses had not been completed for each of R3’s falls and that toileting, identified as a root cause, was not addressed in the care plan until several days after repeated falls. The immediate jeopardy began when NA-C and NA-D had to be stopped from using the wrong harness size for R4 and failed to cinch the torso strap during a sit-to-stand transfer, despite R4’s prior fall from a sit-to-stand lift and existing care plan requirements. The medical director stated that any resident being transferred using a mechanical lift without the care plan and/or policy being followed had the likelihood to cause serious harm, serious injury, or death in the event of a fall from the lift.
Removal Plan
- The facility identified all residents who use a sit-to-stand lift, assessed each resident for the correct harness size needed, and educated each member of the nursing staff who will or may use the sit-to-stand lift.
- The facility assessed R4 and all residents using mechanical lifts for proper transfer method, correct sling/harness size, and care plan accuracy.
- The facility verified sling/harness size for each resident through therapy documentation, direct measurement, manufacturer guidelines, and care plan accuracy.
- The facility reviewed and updated the mechanical lift transfer policy to require sling/harness size documented in the care plan and Kardex, require 2-assist transfers when indicated, require staff verification of sling size prior to transfer, and require cinching of waist/middle straps before elevation.
- The facility updated care plans to specifically identify type of lift, assist level, and sling/harness size.
- The facility updated the Kardex to match the care plan.
- The facility updated care sheets to match the care plan.
- The facility provided education to all licensed nurses and other certified individuals on manufacturer recommendations, proper sling application, proper strap placement and cinching, when sit-to-stand lifts are contraindicated, and always following the care plan.
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